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Abstract 
Managing all your PINs is difficult. Banks acknowledge this by allowing and facilitating PIN 
changes. However, choosing secure PINs is a difficult task for humans as they are incapable of 
consciously generating randomness. This leads to certain PINs being chosen more frequently 
than others, which in turn increases the danger of someone else guessing correctly. We 
investigate different methods of supporting PIN changes and report on an evaluation of these 
methods in a study with 152 participants. Our contribution is twofold: We introduce an 
alternative to system-generated random PINs, which considers people’s preferred memorisation 
strategy, and, secondly, we provide indication that presenting guidance on how to avoid insecure 
PINs does indeed nudge people towards more secure PIN choices when they are in the process 
of changing their PINs. 
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1. Introduction 
Computer systems need to confirm the identity of their users, and the most widely used 
mechanisms are knowledge-based PINs and passwords. Both are essentially secrets 
that should not be divulged to others. People are expected to keep multiple such secrets 
in their memory, memorising a new entry each time a new PIN or password is added. 
The problem is that human memory is fallible and this can result in loss of secrets or 
interference between memorised secrets. 
PINs are banks’ preferred knowledge-based authentication and are thus a fact of life. 
Therefore it is worth considering how we can support customers in managing their 
PINs. While PINs appear in other contexts too, we decided to focus our research on 
banking-related scenarios. Our intention thereby is to encourage security-oriented 
decisions while acknowledging the need for memorisation. In this context, previous 
work has focused on determining people’s mental model of PIN management (Renaud 
and Volkamer, 2015) and on deriving guidance to assist people in memorising their 
PINs (Gutmann et al., 2015). However, people might alternatively want to ease their 
memory load by exercising their ability to change and/or record their PINs. Many 
banks forbid PIN recording, despite many bank customers admitting to engaging in 
this practice anyway. But banks do acknowledge the difficulties people experience in 
retaining all their PINs by allowing and facilitating PIN changes (Murdoch et al., 
2016). Thus the pragmatic course of action is to iterate on the benefits of changing 
PINs and to direct people towards stronger decisions as and when they are about to 
change their PIN. The obvious question left is: “What kind of assistance we can 
provide to bank customers when changing their PINs?” 
In general, there are two means to change PINs: (1) Manually choose one at an ATM, 
or (2) request the bank to generate and issue a new random PIN. A notable drawback 
of the second option is that banks usually issue new PINs by mail, which involves a 
significant time delay. The problem with self-chosen PINs is that humans are generally 
incapable of consciously generating randomness (Figurska et al., 2008) and there is 
further evidence to show that many people do indeed choose insecure PINs (Bonneau 
et al., 2012) (DataGenetics, 2012). In this paper we investigate people’s preferred 
methods to change PINs through a study with 152 participants. Our main contributions 
are: 
1. We suggest an alternative method of generating random PINs: ask the user 
for their preferred memorisation strategy and issue a PIN that matches their 
preferences. 
2. We report on indications that people who opt to receive PIN-changing advice 
seem to indeed choose more secure PINs. 
We introduce and motivate the integral parts of the PIN change procedure Section 2. 
Section 3 examines this procedure with a PIN change survey. The result of this survey 
is presented in Section 4 and discussed in Section 5. In Section 6 we discuss related 
work. In Section 7 we draw conclusions and describe future work. Finally, Section 8 
states the limitations of this paper. 
2. PIN change procedure 
In previous research a study was carried out to explore people's mental models with 
respect to PIN management (Renaud and Volkamer, 2015). With respect to PIN 
changing, therein was reported that people changed their PINs to improve 
memorability, when their bank required it, and when they had lent their bank card to 
someone else. These reasons offer fruitful avenues for providing support depending 
on the card holder’s needs by encouraging and supporting more secure choices. But as 
the reasons for changing differ, so should the provided assistance be flexible. Thus a 
PIN change procedure should provide multiple options catering to people’s needs. 
We designed and tested a PIN change procedure that provides a user with different 
options and empowers them by allowing them to choose the most suitable strategy.  
Our suggestion is composed of four options: (a) Generate a new PIN for those who 
feel confident memorising the next number, but question their ability to choose a 
secure one. (b) Generate a new PIN tailored to some specified memorisation strategy 
for those who have difficulty choosing a secure PIN which they can memorise easily. 
(c) Provide an option to allow the user to choose a PIN for those who have difficulty 
memorising numbers and are confident that they know how to choose a secure PIN. 
(d) Provide recommendations for choosing a PIN to those who have difficulty 
memorising numbers and are open to advice on how to choose secure PINs. 
For option (b), we further decided to provide three memorisation strategies in this 
study: (1) Visualisation: visualising the shape the PIN makes when being entered, (2) 
Arithmetic: splitting the PIN up into two two-digit numbers and memorising these or 
performing some arithmetic on the two halves, and (3) Dictionary: memorising a word 
from the letters imprinted on the PIN’s corresponding buttons on many PIN pads. Our 
third strategy is not among the three most popular memorisation strategies in previous 
work (which would have included Association: associating the PIN with some already 
known number) but was mentioned, too (Renaud and Volkamer, 2015). Our reason for 
this substitution is that we assume it to be unrealistic to emulate an association to a 
number already known to the participants unless we’d pick well-known numbers such 
as the year 1945, a practice that is ill-advised (Bonneau et al., 2012) (DataGenetics, 
2012). 
Option (a) is supposed to primarily satisfy those who change their number after being 
ask to by their bank or after having lent their card to someone else, while option (b) to 
(d) are intended to cater to those who change their PIN to improve memorability. 
3. PIN change survey 
We conducted a survey to investigate user decisions and behaviours when confronted 
with our suggested PIN change procedure. Since anything related to banking and 
money can be expected to be a sensitive topic, we opted for an online study in order 
to provide our participants’ an appropriate feeling of anonymity. 
3.1.1. Attitude towards PIN change 
In order to estimate the participants' general attitudes, our survey began with a question 
regarding their opinion of bank customers being permitted to change their PINs. 
3.1.2. Scenario 
Participants were confronted with the scenario of having received a 4-digit PIN and 
being worried about having difficulties remembering it. The scenario suggests that 
they would consider changing it. The participants were asked whether this constituted 
a realistic scenario for them. Those who confirmed proceeded to the PIN change 
options. Those who declined were presented with four intermediate questions: We 
asked them why the scenario was not realistic, how they usually memorised their PINs, 
how they would recommend others to memorise their PINs, and what they would 
recommend to others who wanted to change their PINs. Thereafter an alternative 
scenario described a situation where they were to assume that someone had observed 
them entering their PIN and they wanted to change it. 
3.1.3. PIN change options 
Before being presented with the actual PIN change options, participants were asked 
whether they would either like their bank to issue them with a new PIN or whether 
they would like to change it themselves at an ATM. 
Those who wanted their bank to change it were presented with options (a) and (b), as 
described in section 2. In short, these options provided were (a) a new random PIN 
and (b) a procedure were the participant was first presented with a list of memorisation 
strategies, asked to choose one, and then issued a new PIN matching the preferred 
memorisation strategy. A picture of an ATM PIN pad supplemented the presented 
memorisation strategies and explanations, which read: Visualisation: The movement 
of a finger entering the PIN results in a pattern, e.g. 2589 depicts the letter L. 
Arithmetic: A mathematical operation on one part of the PIN results in the other, e.g. 
4812 can be memorised with 48 / 4 = 12. Words: Many PIN pads display letters that 
can be used to memorise a word, e.g. 5683 corresponds to the word LOVE. 
Those who wanted to change their PIN via an ATM were given the same options as 
above, including the supplemented picture of an ATM PIN pad, plus PIN change 
options (c) and (d). These two options hadn’t been available for those who asked their 
bank to change the PIN for them, as that would have been a contradiction to options 
(c) and (d) being about choosing the PIN themselves. In short, these options were: (c) 
choosing a new PIN themselves, or (d) being provided with a list of guidelines to help 
them choose a secure PIN. Those guidelines were derived by us based on a webpage 
on PIN analysis (DataGenetics, 2012) and stated: (1) Use three different numbers, but 
not four consecutive numbers. (2) Don't use your birthday or that of close friends or 
relatives. 
No participant had the opportunity to change their mind after having already chosen a 
PIN change option. Those participants who chose option (a) or (b) hadn’t seen the 
provided PIN beforehand to ensure their decision was based on the option itself. They 
further were told that it had been randomly generated, but it was actually the same 
number for all participants. We included that information in the debriefing at the end 
of the survey. 
3.1.4. Questionnaire 
After the previous step had ensured that the participants had completed the mental 
workload of choosing a new PIN, we asked them a series of questions to better 
understand their choices and to be able to better compare the PIN change options (a) 
to (d). Those questions were: (1) Why did you choose this option? (2.1) How would 
you rate the memorability of PINs generated with this option? (2.2) Please explain 
your rating. (3.1) How would you rate the security of PINs generated with this option? 
(3.2) Please explain your rating. (4) Did we miss out a viable PIN changing option? 
 
3.1.5. Demographics 
The survey ended with demographic questions regarding the participants age, number 
of PINs held (and number of unique PINs) across all devices, and a self-assessment on 
a five-scale rating to the following statements: (1) “I  am  experienced  with PINs. ”, 
(2) “I  have  difficulties  with PINs”, and (3) “I  don’t  need  assistance with managing 
my PINs.” 
3.1.6. Debriefing 
Finally, the survey ended with participants being displayed a text for debriefing. 
4. Results 
We recruited 152 participants who reside in the United Kingdom via ClickWorker, an 
online crowd-sourcing platform. Our participants were aged between 18 and 64, and 
on average 33 years old and generally had a positive attitude towards being permitted 
to change their PINs at an ATM. 146 participants (96%) were positive, stating diverse 
reasons such as security, memorability, and being in control. Two participants had no 
opinion and 4 expressed security concerns. 
The majority of all participants (90.1%) rated the presented scenario as realistic. The 
remaining 15, two of whom disapproved of PIN changes, stated ease of memorisation 
as their reason for rejecting the scenario and one disclosed that he usually contacted 
his bank to ask for assistance in managing new PINs. Their recommendations for PIN 
management were either (1) using memorisation strategies, (2) writing it down in a 
secure and offline manner, or (3) to contact their bank and ask for assistance. 
Over two thirds of all participants (67.8%) preferred to change the PIN at an ATM, 
rather than ask their bank for a new one. This proportion increased to 73% in the group 
that acknowledged PIN memorising difficulties. 
Of those 49 who stated that they would ask their bank for a new PIN, 25 preferred a 
randomly generated PIN—(option (a)—and 24 the option based on memorisation 
strategies—option (b). Considering only those with potential memorability issues, the 
numbers change to 11 and 23, respectively. 
Of those 103 participants who chose to change their PIN via an ATM, only three 
considered the memorability scenario as unrealistic. The majority (77%) preferred to 
choose a new PIN without assistance—option (c)—and 18 participants (17%) opted 
for the guidelines—option (d). A further three chose to receive from options (a) and 
(b), each. 
Among all participants who chose option (b)—27 participants in total—the 
visualisation and dictionary strategies (41% and 44% respectively) were the preferred 
methods. 
On being asked why they chose the respective PIN change option, over two thirds 
(72.4%) of participants cited ease of memorisation. 24 participants made their choice 
to maximise perceived security and six named convenience as their main motivation. 
One participant mentioned ‘being in control’ and another mistrusted the integrity of 
ATMs as their sole motivation. Ten participants considered this kind of information 
too sensitive to divulge in an online survey. 
The rating on the memorability and security of all four PIN change methods is depicted 
in Figures 2 and 3. 138 participants justified their rating of the memorability with the 
perceived ease of memorisation, 7 with the number having no meaning and 7 with 
their intuition. More than every second participant (55.3%) based their rating of the 
security on how difficult they assume it would be to guess the PIN. 22.4% each stated 
their intuitive feeling or their exclusive knowledge of the PIN as reason. Few people 
further expressed mistrust towards the integrity of their bank’s procedure when issuing 
new PINs. They assume decreased security of PINs issued this way and therefore 
consider changing every banking PIN at an ATM as only viable option. While no one 
reported any missing PIN change options, two alternatives were mentioned: (1) 
changing a PIN via online banking and (2) on the telephone. 
 
Figure 1: Ratings on the memorability of the provided PIN change options. 
 
Figure 3: Ratings on the security of the provided PIN change options. 
The general tendency on the self-report statements was that people judged themselves 
as being experienced with PINs, experiencing relatively few difficulties and seldom 
requiring assistance. The detailed results are presented in Table 1 and participant 
demographics are reported in Table 2. 
Agreement to statements 
(1: agree, …, 5: disagree) 
1 2 3 4 5 
“I am experienced with PINs.” 65% 21% 11% 3% 1% 
“I have difficulties with my PINs.” 2% 11% 7% 28% 53% 
“I don’t need assistance managing my PINs.” 52% 18% 6% 10% 13% 
Table 1: Participant’s experience with PINs as self-reported. 
Demographics Average Median Maximum Minimum 
Age 33 30 62 18 
Number of PINs 5.2 3 15 1 
Number of unique PINs 4.4 2 15 1 
Table 2: Demographic data as self-reported by participants. 
Lastly some participants volunteered interesting pertinent remarks: (1) “A PIN 
reminder service (not PIN change) can be a lifesaver - banks must provide this at all 
hours, particularly if customers are not allowed to choose their own PIN.” (2) “There 
are many possibilities of ways to change PINs which just haven't been put into use yet. 
Electronic devices, online, mobile.” (3) “There should be more swipe option cards 
available now but security needs to be improved.” 
5. Discussion 
We set out to explore the best form of advice we could formulate in order to guide 
bank customers towards better PIN choice. The first finding of note was that 90% of 
participants considered it realistic to have difficult memorising a newly issued PIN. At 
first glance, this might be in contrast to most people not requiring assistance with their 
PINs (see statement “I don’t need assistance managing my PINs.” in Table 1). On 
second thoughts it makes sense if they had already developed a coping strategy for 
such situations. This explanation is further supported by two third of participants 
choosing to change their PINs at an ATM instead of requesting a new PIN from their 
bank. Furthermore, this does confirm previous findings with respect to people 
rejecting efforts to advise them if they don’t feel that they need such advice (Renaud 
and Volkamer, 2015). The open text responses also seem to confirm this. 
Of those who wanted to change the PIN themselves at an ATM, 77% didn’t want 
recommendations on choosing a new PIN. It might be that the ATM affords a measure 
of autonomy in their choices. On the other hand it could be that self-driven changing 
was the most familiar option. Since people favour familiarity (Maslow, 1943) this 
could have played a role. Neal et al. (Neal et al., 2006) explain that habits, once 
entrenched, constitute part of the person's self-concept. Hence, expecting people to 
change the way they do things, simply because they are given some advice, is clearly 
unrealistic. 
When analysing PINs of a small sample, it is difficult to draw reliable inferences. We 
thus compared the chosen PINs with statistics reported by DataGenetics 
(DataGenetics, 2012). Three out of eighteen participants (17%) who saw the 
guidelines chose common, weak PINs: 1971 (“memorable year”), 1213 (“easy to 
remember”) and 1963 (“year of birth, but not birthday”). 24 out of 79 (30%) who 
declined guidelines chose common PINs: 1234 (8 times), 0000 (4 times), 1111 (3 
times), 1990, 5678, 1968, 2266, 1511, 3232, 9876, 1212, and 2662. All would have 
been discouraged by our guidelines (1990 and 1968 are, as was stated in the comments, 
the participant’s years of birth). This indicates that people who opt to receive advice 
while changing their PIN do make more secure decisions. 
6. Related work 
Banks, who issue PINs, commonly offer advice to their customers such as to 
personalise their PIN when changing it (Murdoch et al., 2016), something that is open 
to a wide range of interpretation. As the DataGenetics webpage (DataGenetics, 2012) 
shows, this changing is likely to have led to more than 10% of PINs being 1234, which 
hardly seems personal but is undeniably memorable. 
Some researchers have attempted to help people retain their PINs. For example, 
Renaud and Smith (Renaud and Smith, 2001) proposed a mechanism called “Jiminy” 
to support secure recording of PINs, but users found it too laborious. Jiminy is a 
software tool that creates a grid of numbers, which could be publicly displayed, 
superimposed onto an image. A coloured template, which was securely stored, 
revealed the PIN. The Spydeberg Sparebank came up with an alternative mechanism 
which assists customers by providing a credit-card sized cut-out. The customer is 
instructed to write the PIN in the grid, using a particular combination of colours and 
positions. This scheme was shown to be insecure, since people demonstrate 
predictability by often using the top left-hand corner of such a grid as an anchor 
(Andriotis et al., 2014). 
Some researchers have attempted to help people by providing them with easy 
memorisation techniques. A promising mechanism that could be used for PINs is 
mnemonics, where you try to make a sentence from the PIN (Bellezza, 1992). So, if 
the PIN were 3822 you might say three men and 8 dogs caught 22 rats.  The power of 
mnemonics is even observed in older adults who often find memorisation challenging 
(Derwinger et al., 2003). Jakobsson and Liu propose deliberately generating PINs that 
create a meaningful mnemonic when typed in (Jakobsson and Liu, 2011). They carried 
out a usability study with 25 participants and three failed initially to understand how 
to enter their PIN, which might be too high for banks to accept. Recent attempts on 
providing guidance to better PIN management were based on PIN related mental 
models (Renaud and Volkamer, 2015), (Gutmann et al., 2015). Marky et al. mentioned 
an implementation thereof as a privacy preserving application for mobile phones 
(Marky et al., 2016). 
When providing guidance and advice, people’s very basic and profound need for 
autonomy, competence and relatedness has to be considered (Reis, 2000). With respect 
to autonomy, Ryan (Ryan, 1993) explains that people engage in a reflective evaluation 
of their options which involves consideration of the person’s interests and needs. 
Hence advice has to appeal to a person’s self-interest and needs. With respect to 
competence, by taking advice a person implicitly acknowledges that they are less than 
competent in a particular area. Gino and Moore (Gino and Moore, 2007) found that 
people were more willing to accept advice if the task was considered to be difficult. 
Choosing a PIN is hardly difficult per se so people might be unwilling to acknowledge 
any lack of competence in this respect. Considering relatedness, Harvey et al. (Harvey 
et al., 2000) explain that people will take advice if they consider the advice giver to be 
more experienced than they are. It seems that a new PIN holder might be willing to 
accept advice, but that others, having worked out PIN strategies for themselves in the 
past, might be less open to advice. 
7. Conclusion and future work 
Our motivation for this research was that we saw the need for people to be given some 
guidance when they choose a new PIN. This, we felt, would make PINs less 
predictable, and thus more resilient to compromise. We discovered indicators that 
presenting people with guidelines on how to choose a secure PIN does improve 
security. Even though our sample was too small to infer a definite improvement, we 
recommend banks to implement such guidance! Future work should investigate 
confirming or rejecting our observation and on how such advice should best be 
designed to maximise its efficacy. 
Regarding the generation of random PINs we introduced a method that is promising 
on improving the memorability without significantly reducing the security. But our 
study didn’t thoroughly evaluate this method and most insights remain hypotheses. 
We see promising indicators and believe that this method has potential, but we also 
cautiously recommend further investigation before considering an implementation. 
8. Limitations 
Questioning people about PIN-related behaviour is a sensitive task. We conducted an 
online survey in order to guarantee anonymity. Such a procedure is always reliant on 
self-report and might sometimes have been performed under time pressure or 
distraction. 10 participants were unwilling to talk about their motivation for choosing 
a particular PIN change option. It might have been something they considered too 
sensitive to disclose. We cannot guarantee that their other responses were truthful 
either, but we were reluctant to exclude them since that might falsify our results. We 
hope that they simply declined to answer questions rather than giving false information 
in responses. Fabrication is a limitation of any study, even those carried out in a lab. 
We acknowledge this but do not know how to ameliorate it. 
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